
Pakistan-China Relations Higher than the Mountains, Deeper than the Oceans

Mohan Guruswamy

Pakistan was among the early countries and the first Muslim nation to break relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan) and recognise the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1950. It established formal diplomatic relations with the PRC on May 21, 1951. But soon after this, Pakistan joined both the major the American sponsored military pacts in the region, Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO)¹ and Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO)² to contain the Communist threat posed by the Soviet Union and its principal ally then, the PRC. It would, however, seem that this did not inhibit Pakistan from maintaining a close and often cooperative relationship with the PRC. In an interview with a Pakistani journalist, Mahmood-ul-Hassan Khan, on July 29, 2009, the Chinese Ambassador to Pakistan, Luo Zhaohui, said: "Pakistan was one of the first countries to recognize New China. Ever since our diplomatic relations began in May 1951, we have enjoyed mutual understanding, respect, trust and support and our friendship and cooperation have flourished. We are truly good neighbors, close friends, trusted partners and dear brothers. When China was in difficulty caused by the western blockades in the 1950s and 60s, it was Pakistan which opened an air corridor linking China with the outside world. In the 1970s, it was Pakistan which served as a bridge for the normalization of China-US relations."³ Pakistani diplomacy has always had a track record of deftness and alacrity in furthering its perceived national interests, and there is no reason to doubt the ambassador's acknowledgment of Pakistan's assistance in overcoming the Western blockade.

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Even while the “Western blockade” was on, China invaded the Chamdo region of Tibet⁴ and this caused New Delhi to express its apprehensions. China curtly told India that it was none of its concern, and was an internal matter of China. Pakistan surely took note of this. The discovery by India of the Xinjiang-Tibet highway across the Aksai China in the early 1950s would also have not gone unnoticed in Pakistan, considering that it too shared a border with China in the region. Besides, there was much public consternation in India over this and the matter had caused some acrimony in the Indian Parliament and media. This could have provided it with just the motivation to seek a better understanding with Beijing, despite the military alliances it was a member of. Then, as it is today, Pakistan’s main foreign policy focus was India. That is what took it into the Western alliances and that would have also taken it to seek rapport with China.

Even before India became independent and China became Communist, there were visible tensions between the two countries. In March 1947, four months before independence, the Congress Party organised the Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi. The Chinese delegation expressed unhappiness that Tibet was invited separately. They tried very hard to make the Tibetan delegation sit with them. Then they protested about the map of Asia that formed the backdrop to the main dais, which showed Tibet as an independent country. They wanted the painting modified immediately. The Chinese anxiety that the conference was in part India’s aim to implicitly acquire leadership in Asia came to the fore when the location of the Secretariat of the proposed Asian Relations Organisation, the apex body of the member nations, was being discussed. India has assumed that it would be in India. China objected to it. It was then decided to rotate it half yearly between New Delhi and Beijing. Nothing was heard of this organisation after this and it died soon after.⁵

Whether this Pakistani opening with China was done with the tacit blessings of the US is not known, but it is well known that the US had established close ties with several top Chinese leaders, including Mao Zedong during World War II and this included the establishment of a US military mission to provide requisite assistance to the Chinese Communists in the war with Japan.⁶ Despite the Korean War, there were many in the USA who nursed a desire to establish ties with Beijing and to break its alliance with Moscow. Thus, this could have very well been possible, because by 1956, Chinese ties with the Soviet Union were souring, with Nikita Khrushchev denouncing the Stalinist excesses and the personality cult. It would not have also gone unnoticed in China that India had supported the United Nations operations in Korea and even took part in it.

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The 60th Parachute Field Ambulance Platoon was much more than the title “platoon” indicates. For all intents it was a mobile army surgical hospital (MASH.) Commanded by Li Col AG Rangaraj, it joined UN forces at Pyongyang on December 4, 1950, just in time to take part in the 8th Army’s withdrawal out of North Korea. As a sidebar, some members of the 60th Indian Field Ambulance Platoon jumped with the US 187th Regimental Combat Team at Munsan-ni on March 22, 1951.⁷ This participation on the opposite side, however modest, too would not have gone unnoticed in China which was the main adversary after the North Korean Army

folded under after the landings at Inchon.

Subsequent to the events of 1948 which saw the accession of the hitherto princely state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) into the Indian Union and after its failed attempt to seize it by force, Pakistan had only one enemy and its energies were, and are still, fully focussed on it. China, given its rivalry and tensions with India, was/is a natural ally for Pakistan. The 1962 India-China border war was the major turning point in Pakistan-China relations. In the immediate wake of the 1962 War, as India turned to the West for support, it soon found itself under severe pressure by the US and UK to “settle” the J&K dispute with Pakistan, either by a partition of the state or by accepting a UN supervised compromise.⁸ India balked at this, realising that little would come out of it; Pakistan turned to China, no doubt, deriving moral and intellectual sustenance from the old Arab proverb: “My enemy’s enemy is my friend.”⁹ The Chinese have an even more apt proverb: “It is good to strike the serpent’s head with your enemy’s hand.” It made sense to befriend Pakistan because it gave it a suitable stick to belabour India. It is still open to debate whether China’s investment in a relationship with Pakistan is anything more than just this.

Faced with a common enemy, Sino-Pakistan relations flourished. In 1963, Pakistan and China reached their first formal trade pact. The same year, they also reached a border agreement, with Pakistan ceding the Shaksgam Valley in the disputed Northern Territories to China. In 1965, Pakistan and India went to war and China supported Pakistan diplomatically. It would seem that China was even readying to open a front with India when it served India with a three-

day ultimatum to dismantle certain posts on the contested Sino-Indian border. But before the Chinese could act, Pakistan accepted a UN call for a ceasefire. It is said that the Pakistanis told Mao Zedong that the cost of continued fighting was far too high, both diplomatically and economically. However, Mao pressed the Pakistanis to fight on, sending President Ayub Khan the message: "If there is a nuclear war, it is Beijing that will be a target and not Rawalpindi." But the Pakistanis could not oblige.¹⁰

But the big step forward in Pakistan-China relations came in 1970, when it helped in setting up the contacts to facilitate the historic secret visit to China of US National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger. The rest is history. Kissinger's and President Nixon's personal animosity for Indira Gandhi was well known.¹¹ Soon a US-China-Pakistan troika came into being. The highpoint of this came when India and Pakistan went to war in 1971 over Bangladesh. Despite major efforts by the USA and China acting in concert, India inflicted a huge military defeat on Pakistan and succeeded in liberating Bangladesh from West Pakistan. The war was prolonged in East Pakistan because of the expectations of a third front by China.¹² The Chinese failure to intervene, beyond making a few noises, did not, however, dampen Sino-Pakistan relations.

In 1974, India tested a nuclear device and this provided even greater impetus to Sino-Pakistan relations. China now began actively assisting Pakistan's nuclear programme. Even though China and Pakistan reached a comprehensive nuclear cooperation agreement only in 1986, much was happening. "US officials have said on many occasions that since the early 1980s, Pakistan received a proven weapon design from China. It has been reported that this design was that used in China's fourth nuclear weapons test in 1966 at Lop Nor. This test involved the detonation of a warhead carried by a missile."¹³ These efforts fructified in the mid-1980s when Pakistan assembled and tested a Chinese designed nuclear bomb in the Lop Nor testing grounds in northern Tibet.¹⁴ In 1998, India tested a series of nuclear weapons over a period of two days. Pakistan followed soon after by also testing five weapons. The weapons were out in the open. There was little doubt that China and its North Korean ally had actively assisted Pakistan to not only develop nuclear weapons but also the missile delivery systems. This co-operation continues even now.

In 1999, India and Pakistan again went to war following the occupation of the Kargil heights by units of the Pakistan Army. The ferocity of the Indian counter-attack which also used its air force and none too subtle diplomatic pressure from US President Bill Clinton, forced Pakistan to withdraw to pre-conflict positions

and accept a ceasefire. But this time around, China was much muted in its support.¹⁵ Did this signal any change in attitude towards Pakistan? Or was it just another phase in Chinese policy?

But then what is the Chinese policy? Why is China investing so much, even at the cost of earning global opprobrium as an irresponsible proliferator and even at the risk of poisoning its relations with India for times to come? To put it very simply, China and Pakistan have traditionally valued one another as a strategic hedge against India. "For China, Pakistan is a low-cost secondary deterrent to India," current Pakistani Ambassador to the United States Husain Haqqani told CFR.org in 2006, when he was a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. "For Pakistan," he said, "China is a high-value guarantor of security against India."

India has long been perturbed by China's military aid to Pakistan. K Alan Kronstadt, a specialist in South Asian affairs at the non-partisan Congressional Research Service, writes that observers in India see Chinese support for Pakistan as "a key aspect of Beijing's perceived policy of 'encirclement' or constraint of India as a means of preventing or delaying New Delhi's ability to challenge Beijing's region-wide influence." China and India fought a border war in 1962, and both still claim the other is occupying large portions of their territory. "The 1962 Sino-Indian border conflict was a watershed moment for the region," says John W Garver, professor of international relations at the Georgia Institute of Technology. "Both China and India incurred heavy costs on their economic development, and both sides shifted their policy over time to become more accommodating to growth."¹⁶

China, since the economic reforms of 1976, has shown great flexibility in conducting its relations with all its neighbours, adversaries and rivals. Japan is its largest trading partner and is a major investor in China's manufacturing sector. Taiwan, which China officially considers a renegade province, is its second largest overseas investor. The USA is China's largest export market. China's annual bilateral trade with India has been growing exponentially and has now crossed \$40 billion.¹⁷ By 2012, this is slated to rise to \$60 billion. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) which is extremely wary of China, is also a major investor in China. China's cumulative Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is now close to \$ 1 trillion. Till 2007, it had received \$750 billion and it has been receiving an average of \$70 billion every year since then.¹⁸ FDI investors now account for 57 percent of Chinese exports. Without exports China's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth will splutter to a halt. Also, without FDI, its export sector will not

be able to sustain the frenetic pace of growth it has set for the Chinese economy. It is a testimony to Chinese pragmatism that three of the top four FDI investors it has, namely Japan, Taiwan and the US, are countries with which it has troubled relations. It is this pragmatism that leads China to believe that it can have a much greater economic engagement with India and still hedge against its emergence as a strong rival in Asia and on the global stage.

Pakistan desisted from attacking India in 1962 when it was extremely vulnerable. Pressure from the West and particularly by the Kennedy Administration was a major factor. Before the second phase of the 1962 conflict, military supplies from the USA and UK had started pouring in. The USA even established a Military Assistance Group (MAG) in New Delhi to process India's wish lists. In turn, the West began applying pressure on India to seek a speedy resolution of the Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) dispute. The Americans were particularly keen on settling the issue with a new line running slightly east of the existing Line of Control (LoC).¹⁹ That moment soon passed. Neither side was ready for any major compromise. After inflicting another defeat in the Northeast Frontier Agency (NEFA), China unilaterally withdrew to positions it held before the conflict. India was quick to wind up the US MAG soon after and revert to its policy of non-alignment. By mid-1963, Pakistan-China relations were on an upswing, with the signing of an economic cooperation agreement.

Should this moment of vulnerability ever arise again, Indian strategists are generally agreed that Pakistan will not let it pass. It will find the temptation of attempting a seizure of Kashmir by force of arms. Indian military doctrines, therefore, now emphasise the capability to fight a two-front war.²⁰ Indian strategists are also generally agreed, that because of the high costs involved, China will not seek to attack India in the event of a conflict with Pakistan. China has had the opportunity to do so three times since 1962 and it has not taken advantage of India's military preoccupations with Pakistan. On the other hand, during the Kargil conflict of 1999, China actually took the position that Pakistan must withdraw from the areas it had occupied.²¹ Lisa Curtis of the Heritage Foundation, in her testimony to the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, said: "China's interest in improving

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ties to India over the last decade has spurred Beijing to develop a more neutral position on the Kashmir issue, rather than reflexively taking Pakistan's side, which has traditionally meant supporting United Nations resolutions calling for a plebiscite or backing Pakistan's attempts to wrest the region by force, as with Pakistan's 1965 Operation Gibraltar. A turning point in China's position on Kashmir came during the 1999 Kargil crisis when Beijing helped convince Pakistan to withdraw forces from the Indian side of the Line of Control following its incursion into the Kargil region of Jammu and Kashmir. Beijing made clear its position that the two sides should resolve

the Kashmir conflict through bilateral negotiations, not military force. India was pleased with China's stance on the Kargil crisis, which allowed Beijing and New Delhi to overcome tensions in their relations that had developed over India's 1998 nuclear tests."

Commenting further on China's concerns about the current unstable situation in Pakistan, Curtis went on to testify: "One source of tension between Beijing and Islamabad that has surfaced has been the issue of Chinese Uighur separatists receiving sanctuary and training on Pakistani territory." The Chinese province of Xinjiang is home to 8 million Muslim Uighurs, many of whom resent the growing presence and economic grip on the region of the Han Chinese. Some have agitated for an independent "East Turkestan." To mollify Chinese concerns, Pakistan in recent years has begun to clamp down on Uighur settlements and religious schools used as training grounds for militants. Media reports indicate that Pakistan may have extradited as many as nine Uighurs to China in April after accusing them of involvement in terrorist activities.

Tension has also surfaced over Islamist extremism in Pakistan. It came to a head in the summer of 2007 when vigilantes kidnapped several Chinese citizens whom they accused of running a brothel in Islamabad. China was incensed by this incident, and its complaints to Pakistani authorities likely contributed to Pakistan's decision to finally launch a military operation at the Red Mosque in Islamabad, where the militants had been holed up since January 2007. Around the same time-frame as the Red Mosque episode, three Chinese officials were killed in Peshawar in July 2007. Several days later, a suicide bomber attacked a group of Chinese engineers in Baluchistan. Last August, Islamist extremists abducted Chinese engineer, Long

Ziaowei, in Pakistan's Swat Valley. The Chinese protested vehemently to the Pakistani government and Ziaowei was released unharmed in February.

Security concerns about Pakistan could move the Chinese in the direction of working more closely with the international community to help stabilise the country. During President Zardari's visit to Beijing in October 2008, Beijing resisted providing Pakistan a large-scale bail-out from its economic crisis, thus, forcing Islamabad to accept an International Monetary Fund programme with stringent conditions for economic reform. Beijing did come through with a soft loan of about \$500 million, though.²²

The Chinese find the current situation in Pakistan uncomfortable, to say the least. They have time and again expressed concern over the domestic situation within Pakistan. In several recent Track II dialogues with Chinese think-tanks in which this writer has participated, Chinese scholars and officials have expressed concern about the deteriorating situation in Pakistan and were in full agreement with the Indian discussants that several militant groups now seemed to be acting independently even of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and Pakistan military. The repeated attacks on Chinese nationals by *jihadists* in Pakistan were enough proof of this. "The Chinese have also expressed concern and Chinese investment projects in the region are now important not simply in scale but in their strategic nature. The Gwadar port and the linked prospect of an energy corridor to China's northwest, for example, are valuable well beyond their economic worth. Yet, all of these projects — including the much-touted Aynak mine — are on go-slow until Chinese confidence about stability has returned. Pakistan's military is no longer able to ensure that Chinese interests are given a privileged and protected status. Whether it comes to attacks on Chinese assets or the kidnappings and killings of Chinese workers, the threats have been growing as the situation in Pakistan has deteriorated. China has become a target for groups well beyond ETIM and Baluchi nationalists ever since its involvement in the Red Mosque incident. Political tensions with the Pakistani government over these issues have grown markedly in the past year."²³

Like many US and Western scholars and writers, their Chinese counterparts too privately express concern about the security of Pakistan's nuclear assets and fear the takeover of Pakistan by fundamentalist elements. Much has been written

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and said about this subject and the Chinese authorities who are as influenced by Western views on any subject as their other international counterparts would certainly not be unconcerned about “loose nukes” in Pakistan.²⁴ Nevertheless economic and military cooperation between the two countries proceeds unabated. China has been a steady source of military equipment to the Pakistan Army and also has helped Pakistan to set up mass weapons production factories and has given technology assistance and modernised facilities.

In the last 20 years, the countries have been involved in joint ventures of several projects to enhance military and weaponry systems, which include the JF-17 Thunder fighter aircraft, K-8 Karakorum advance training aircraft, missile technology, Al-Khalid main battle tanks, Babur cruise missiles. The armies have a regular schedule for organising joint military exercises. China is the largest investor in the Gwadar deep sea port, which is strategically located at the mouth of the Straits of Hormuz.²⁵

China has become one of the top five import sources of Pakistan. Major imports from China are machinery, chemicals, garments and other textile products, stationery, construction materials like tiles, sanitary ware, and crockery, etc. Machinery and electrical appliances are the major parts of overall exports. Bilateral trade had reached around \$7 billion in 2008. The balance is, however, in favour of China due to far fewer imports by China.

Under the five-year programme launched in 2006 for strengthening of economic relations, the existing trade is to be enhanced to \$15 billion by 2012. Besides, different projects have been identified in the programme for cooperation and investment in various economic fields. Permanent and enduring factors that may prove effective and successful in the demand and supply dynamics need to be enforced through mutual cooperation. Some restrictions on free movement of goods and services are occasionally reported and are often discussed for removal to further enhance the volume of trade and significant increase in investment. Both countries can benefit greatly from further expansion in economic and trade relations under this five-year programme.

China has also been generous to Pakistan with financial assistance at crucial times. Recently, China agreed to extend \$500 million in financial aid to Pakistan, according to a senior Pakistani official, a breakthrough for the South Asian nation and a rare move by China to take a leadership role in an international crisis. Shaukat Tarin, economic adviser to Pakistan's prime minister and the nation's *de facto* finance minister, said that China agreed to provide the assistance following the recently visit to Beijing of Pakistan's President Asif Ali Zardari.²⁶

The Pakistan-China relationship has been one of the world's enduring relationships of the last five decades. It has stood the test of time and some very difficult circumstances. The Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Zhijun described it best: "We have a friendly relationship with Pakistan that we call all-weather friendship and we cooperate in all areas, including energy." Zhijun was responding to a question by a correspondent of *The Pakistan Observer*, who led a group of 26 South Asian and Southeast Asian journalists invited for a meeting with him at the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.²⁷ Pakistan President Asif Ali Zardari, echoed a similar perception when he told a group of Chinese journalists: "In spite of changes that have occurred in the regional and international environment, the friendship between Pakistan and China is time-tested and has turned increasingly firmer and much more solid as time goes by and is deep-rooted in the hearts and ethos of people of the two nations."²⁸ But most eloquent of them all was Chinese President Hu Jintao when he said they were "higher than the mountains and deeper than the oceans".²⁹ And, indeed, they are.

Notes

1. The Central Treaty Organisation (also referred to as CENTO, its original name was Middle East Treaty Organisation or METO, also known as the Baghdad Pact) was adopted in 1955 by Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. It was dissolved in 1979. Modelled after the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), CENTO committed the nations to mutual cooperation and protection, as well as non-intervention in each other's affairs. Its goal was to contain the USSR by having a line of strong states along the USSR's southwestern frontier. Similarly, it was known as the "Northern Tier" to prevent Soviet expansion into the Middle East. Unlike NATO, CENTO did not have a unified military command structure, nor were many US or UK military bases established in member countries, although the US had communications and electronic intelligence facilities in Iran, and operated U-2 intelligence flights over the USSR from bases in Pakistan. The United Kingdom had access to facilities in Pakistan and Iraq at various times while the treaty was in effect. In addition, Turkey and the US agreed to permit American access to Turkish bases, but this was done under the auspices of NATO.
2. SEATO was planned to be a Southeast Asian version of NATO, in which the military forces of each member would be coordinated to provide for the collective defence of any member country. SEATO did use portions of the military forces of its members in annual joint training manoeuvres. The membership of SEATO reflected a mid-1950s' combination of "out of area" powers and "in area" pro-Western nations. France, the

United Kingdom, and the United States represented the strongest Western powers. Australia, Thailand, the Philippines, and New Zealand represented the Europeanised or pro-Western nations in the Southeast Asian area. Pakistan was included not only because East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) was geographically close to Southeast Asia, but possibly because Pakistan was a member of the pro-Western CENTO alliance. Thus, the pro-Western, anti-Communist military alliances of the Mid-East and Southeast Asia were linked by the membership of Pakistan in both.

3. <http://www.opfblog.com/8824/interview-with-honorable-luo-zhaohui-ambassador-of-china-in-pakistan>
4. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) first entered eastern Tibet on October 7, 1950. The highly mobile units of the PLA quickly surrounded the outnumbered Tibetan forces and by October 19, 1950, 5,000 Tibetan soldiers had been killed and the small Tibetan Army had surrendered. After confiscating their weapons, the PLA soldiers gave the prisoners lectures on socialism and a small amount of money, before allowing them to return to their homes.
5. LC Jain, "The Lost Heart of Asia", *The Hindu*, Sunday, February 7, 2010.
6. However, a perception grew that Chiang's government was unable to effectively resist the Japanese, or that he preferred to focus more on defeating the Communists. Americans debated policy, China hands such as Stilwell arguing that it was in American interest to establish communication with the Communists to prepare for a land-based counter-offensive in the invasion of Japan. The Dixie Mission, starting in 1943, was the first official American contact with the Communists. Others, such as Claire Chennault, argued for air power. After World War II ended in 1945, the hostility between the Republic of China (ROC) and the Communist Party of China (CPC) exploded into open civil war. Gen Douglas MacArthur directed the military forces under Chiang Kai-shek to go to the island of Taiwan to accept the surrender of Japanese troops, thus, beginning the military occupation of Taiwan. American Gen George C Marshall tried to broker a truce between the ROC and the CPC in 1946, but it quickly lost momentum, and the Nationalist cause went steadily downhill until 1949, when the Communists emerged victorious and drove the Nationalists from the Chinese mainland onto Taiwan and other islands.
7. <http://www.korean-war.com/60thindian.html>
8. *Foreign Relations of the United States 1961-1963*, Vol. XIX, *South Asia*. W Averell Harriman, assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern Affairs, and Duncan Sandys, British secretary of state for Commonwealth relations, led a small group of diplomatic and military experts to India on November 22. While the experts assessed India's military needs, Harriman, Sandys, and Galbraith discussed the implications of

the border war with Nehru. Harriman and Sandys made clear their governments' willingness to provide military assistance to India but pointed out the related need for negotiations to resolve the Kashmir dispute. In a private meeting with Nehru, Harriman stated that unless tensions over Kashmir eased, the United States could not continue to provide military assistance to both parties to the conflict. Nehru reluctantly agreed to negotiations but warned that in the wake of the humiliation suffered by India at the hands of China, Indian public opinion would not stand for significant concessions to Pakistan over Kashmir.

9. In Mathew, Chapter 22, the Pharisees and the Herodians united against Jesus. Even though they hated each other, they had a common enemy.
10. Jung Chang and Jon Halliday, *Mao: The Unknown Story* (Vintage Books, ISBN 978-0-099-50737-6) p. 606.
11. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/south_asia/4633263.stm "We really slobbered over the old witch," says President Nixon. "The Indians are bastards anyway," says Mr. Kissinger. "They are starting a war there." He adds: "While she was a bitch, we got what we wanted too. She will not be able to go home and say that the United States didn't give her a warm reception and, therefore, in despair she's got to go to war."
12. Office of the Historian at the US State Department released Vol XI of the *Foreign Relations of the United States* devoted to the "South Asia Crisis, 1971", in other words, the Bangladesh War. "On November 10, Nixon instructed Kissinger to ask the Chinese to move some troops toward the Indian frontier. 'Threaten to move forces or move them, Henry, that's what they must do now.' This was conveyed to Huang Hua, China's envoy to the United Nations. Kissinger told Huang the US would be prepared for a military confrontation with the Soviet Union if the Soviet Union attacked China. On December 12, the White House received an urgent message. The Chinese wanted to meet in New York. General Alexander Haig, then Kissinger's deputy, rushed to the venue, but was disappointed. Huang just wanted to convey his government's stand in the UN, no word of an attack in Sikkim or in the then North-East Frontier Agency (now, the northeastern states). The myth of the Chinese intervention is also visible in the secret Pakistani dispatches. Lieutenant General A A K Niazi, the Pakistani army commander in Dhaka, was informed: 'NEFA front has been activated by Chinese although the Indians for obvious reasons have not announced it.' Until the last day of the war, Pakistan expected its Chinese savior to strike, but Beijing never did."
13. From the bulletin.org of David Albright and Mark Hibbs, "Pakistan's Bomb: Out of the Closet", *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, Vol 48, No 6, July/August 1992, pp 38-43.
14. Thomas C Reed and Danny B Stillman, *THE NUCLEAR EXPRESS: A Political History of the Bomb and Its Proliferation* (Zenith Press, 2009), pp. viii + 392. "They also believe

that ties between China and Pakistan led to Pakistan's confidence in its nuclear weapons. Specifically, they maintain that at the behest of Benazir Bhutto, China tested an atomic bomb for Pakistan on May 26, 1990, at the Lop Nor Nuclear Test Site. As supporting evidence, they note that after the Indian nuclear tests of 1998, it took only two weeks and three days for the Pakistanis to field and fire a nuclear device of their own"; also see, Bob Woodward article in *Washington Post* which cites an alleged DIA report saying Pakistan "detonated a high explosive test device between Sept. 18 and Sept. 21 as part of its continuing efforts to build an implosion-type nuclear weapon;" it says Pakistan has produced uranium enriched to a 93.5 percent level; additionally, please also take into account that periodic revelations confirming the successful advance of the Pakistani programme were turning up with some regularity. Drawn to the limelight, the leader of Pakistan's uranium enrichment programme, Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan held periodic interviews boasting about Pakistan's nuclear prowess. It was in such an interview in February 1984 that he first made the claim that Pakistan had achieved nuclear weapons capability. In July 1984, the *New York Times* reported that US intelligence had learned that the previous year, China had supplied Pakistan with the design of an actual tested nuclear device — the design of China's fourth nuclear weapon tested in 1966 with a yield of 25 KT. This is said to be a low weight (200 kg class) solid-core bomb design. Reports have also surfaced that China also provided sufficient highly enriched uranium (HEU) to construct one or two weapons in 1983. In 1998, A Q Khan stated that Pakistan had acquired the capability to explode a nuclear device at the end of 1984.

15. "ASEAN Backs India's Stand", *The Tribune*, July 24, 2006. Retrieved May 20, 2009. The G8 nations supported India and condemned the Pakistani violation of the Line of Control (LoC) at the Cologne Summit. The European Union also opposed Pakistan's violation of the LoC. China, a long-time ally of Pakistan, insisted on a pullout of forces to the pre-conflict positions along the LoC and settling border issues peacefully. Other organisations also supported India's stand on the inviolability of the LoC; in fact, experts say all countries in the region are reevaluating their traditional positions. "Everyone in the region has learned to [develop] a relatively non-ideological set of policies," says Kenneth G Lieberthal, a noted China expert and professor at the University of Michigan. As CSIS's Parker and Schaffer note, China has taken a more neutral position on India-Pakistan issues such as Kashmir in the past decade and a half, and has "begun to take the relationship with India more seriously." A case in point, they say, was China's dissatisfaction with Pakistani military action across the LoC, which separates India- and Pakistan-controlled Kashmir, during the 1999 Kargil conflict.

16. Jamal Afridi, "China-Pakistan Relations," August 20, 2009, Council on Foreign Relations. <http://www.cfr.org/publication/10070>
17. *The Times of India*, April 14, 2010. Bilateral trade with China has already exceeded \$40 billion, making Beijing New Delhi's largest trading partner.
18. Cumulative FDI in China exceeds \$750 billion (from Xinhua 28.08.2007). China's actual use of FDI had cumulatively exceeded \$750 billion by the end of June 2007 since the beginning of its opening-up policy in 1978, according to a senior commerce official. Vice Minister of Commerce Wei Jianguo said the country had approved the establishment of 610,000 foreign-funded enterprises by the end of June 2007. In the first half of 2007, exports of foreign-funded enterprises accounted for 57 percent of the nation's total, said Wei at a forum on the social responsibility of foreign-funded enterprises. AG Noorani, "A Working Paper on Kashmir," *The Frontline*, Vol 23, Issue 04, February 25 - March 10, 2006 "The Swaran Singh-Bhutto talks in 1962-63 centered on drawing an international boundary through Kashmir (*vide* YD Gundevia's *Outside the Archives*, page 248; he was Foreign Secretary. Brigadier D.K. Palit, director, Military Operations, gives details in his memoirs *War in High Himalayas*, page 393). Swaran Singh asked Palit, 'If I could consider offering a little more of Kashmir Valley because Pakistan's acceptance of partition would hinge on how much of the Valley we were willing to give up'. Palit demurred, but Swaran Singh was all for it. He went so far as to offer 'the Handwara area' in the northwest of the Valley to Pakistan. Bhutto asked for the entire state bar Kathua."
19. *Foreign Relations of the United States 1961-1963*, Vol. XIX, *South Asia*: Much of the time and effort devoted to South Asia by the Kennedy Administration during the following months was spent in a fruitless attempt to resolve the Kashmir dispute. With steady encouragement and prodding from Washington and London, Indian Minister for Railways Swaran Singh and Pakistani Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto met six times between December 26, 1962, and May 16, 1963, to explore the basis for a settlement. On February 21, with the talks apparently stalemated, Kennedy instructed his advisers, in Rusk's words, "to wade into the effort from their ankles up to their knees." (p. 258) Rusk travelled to India and Pakistan in May to try to find an approach that might produce a solution. He and Sandys met with Nehru and Ayub and managed to convince them to explore the possibility of mediation rather than accept the failure of the ministerial negotiations (pp. 286, 288)." Again, however, the effort got nowhere.
20. David Blumenthal, "India Prepares for a Two-Front War" *The Wall Street Journal*, March 1, 2010. "There is one country responding to China's military build-up and aggressiveness with some muscle of its own. No, it is not the United States, the superpower ostensibly responsible for maintaining peace and security in Asia. Rather,

it is India, whose military is currently refining a 'two-front war' doctrine to fend off Pakistan and China simultaneously. Delhi has begun planning to fight a 'two-front war' in case China and Pakistan ally against India. Army Chief of Staff General Deepak Kapoor recently outlined the strategy: both 'fronts'—the northeastern one with China and northwestern one with Pakistan—would receive equal attention. If attacked by Pakistan and China, India will use its new integrated battle groups to deal quick decisive blows against both simultaneously. The two-front strategy's ambitions go even further: In the long-term, China is the real focus for Indian strategists. According to local newspapers, General Kapoor told a defense seminar late last year that India's forces will 'have to substantially enhance their strategic reach and out-of-area capabilities to protect India's geopolitical interests stretching from the [Persian] Gulf to Malacca Strait' and 'to protect our island territories' and assist 'the littoral states in the Indian Ocean Region.'

21. Experts say all countries in the region are reevaluating their traditional positions. "Everyone in the region has learned to [develop] a relatively non-ideological set of policies," says Kenneth G Lieberthal, a noted China expert and professor at the University of Michigan. As CSIS's Parker and Schaffer note, China has taken a more neutral position on India-Pakistan issues such as Kashmir in the past decade and a half, and has "begun to take the relationship with India more seriously." A case in point, they say, was China's dissatisfaction with Pakistani military action across the Line of Control, which separates India and Pakistan-controlled Kashmir, during the 1999 Kargil conflict.
22. Testimony before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, May 20, 2009, by Lisa Curtis, Heritage Foundation, Washington DC, Research/Testimony/Chinas-Military-and-Security-Relationship-with-Pakistan
23. Time for a Presidential Decision on Afghanistan: Afghanistan-Pakistan: Bringing China (back) in. German Marshall Fund video. <http://blog.gmfus.org/2009/10/23/afghanistan-pakistan-bringing-back-china-in>
24. Thomas Donnelly, *Choosing Among Bad Options: The Pakistani 'Loose Nukes' Conundrum* "The prospect that a nuclear-capable state may lose control of some of its weapons to terrorists is one of the greatest dangers the United States and its allies face, warns the Quadrennial Defense Review report. The report states that at its core, the problem is one of 'internal instability.' While this sort of language might seem vague and euphemistic, Pentagon planners have a very specific place in mind: Pakistan. Our most strategically immediate proliferation problems are posed by North Korea and Iran, two states that are obviously hostile to the United States. But a more important problem may be that of Pakistan, a crucial ally in the global war on terror and the broader war for the future

of the Islamic world. The situation in Pakistan makes any possible military action to deal with future problems associated with its nuclear weapons extremely difficult. It would be hard to know in advance whether American intervention in a Pakistani crisis--whether related to nuclear weapons, materials, or facilities--would make things better or make them worse. <http://www.aei.org/outlook/24416>

25. Lisa Curtis' Testimony before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission May 20, 2009. "China is Pakistan's largest defense supplier. China transferred equipment and technology and provided scientific expertise to Pakistan's nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs throughout the 1980s and 1990s, enhancing Pakistan's strength in the South Asian strategic balance. The most significant development in China-Pakistan military cooperation occurred in 1992 when China supplied Pakistan with 34 short-range ballistic M-11 missiles. [4] Recent sales of conventional weapons to Pakistan include JF-17 aircraft, JF-17 production facilities, and F-22P frigates with helicopters, K-8 jet trainers, T-85 tanks, F-7 aircraft, small arms, and ammunition. [5] Beijing also built a turnkey ballistic-missile manufacturing facility near the city of Rawalpindi and helped Pakistan develop the 750-km-range, solid-fueled Shaheen-1 ballistic missile. [6] While the US has sanctioned Pakistan in the past--in 1965 and again in 1990--China has consistently supported Pakistan's military modernization effort.

"China has helped Pakistan build two nuclear reactors at the Chasma site in the Punjab Province and continues to support Pakistan's nuclear program, although it has been sensitive to international condemnation of the A. Q. Khan affair and has calibrated its nuclear assistance to Pakistan accordingly. During Pakistani President Zardari's visit to Beijing in mid-October 2008, Beijing pledged to help Pakistan construct two new nuclear power plants at Chasma, but did not propose or agree to a major China-Pakistan nuclear deal akin to the US-India civil nuclear agreement."

26. <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122660181953225067>
27. <http://pakobserver.net/detailnews.asp?id=28360>
28. <http://english.peopledaily.com/90001/90780/91342/6514759.html>
29. "Pakistan and China have an immense reservoir of goodwill and soft power. The legendary friendship between Pakistan and China is palpable in the Pakistani and Chinese street and in the majestic halls of government. Usually, Pakistani and Chinese leaders and people use six expressions to describe this unique relationship. It is higher than the mountains, deeper than the oceans, sweeter than honey, stronger than steel, all-weather and time-tested. Recently, I heard yet another expression: it is dearer and nearer than the eyes." From a speech by Ambassador Masood Khan at Tsinghua University, Beijing, September 8, 2009; also see, <http://www.littleabout.com/news/58891,pakistan-china-enhance-military-cooperation.html>